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Merge pull request #6599 from joefarebrother/android-sensitive-communication
Java: Promote android sensitive broadcast query
This commit is contained in:
Joe Farebrother
@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
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lgtm,codescanning
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* The query "Leaking sensitive information through an implicit Intent" (`java/android/sensitive-communication`) has been promoted from experimental to the main query pack. Its results will now appear by default. The query was originally [submitted as an experimental query by @luchua-bc.](https://github.com/github/codeql/pull/4512)
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@@ -79,6 +79,7 @@ private module Frameworks {
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private import internal.ContainerFlow
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Android
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Intent
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.SQLite
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.XssSinks
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.ApacheHttp
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.apache.Collections
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@@ -114,8 +115,6 @@ private module Frameworks {
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private import semmle.code.java.security.OgnlInjection
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private import semmle.code.java.security.XPath
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private import semmle.code.java.security.XsltInjection
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Android
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.SQLite
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.Jdbc
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.SpringJdbc
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private import semmle.code.java.frameworks.MyBatis
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@@ -0,0 +1,179 @@
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/** Provides definitions to reason about Android Sensitive Communication queries */
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Intent
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import semmle.code.java.security.SensitiveActions
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/**
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* Gets regular expression for matching names of Android variables that indicate the value being held contains sensitive information.
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*/
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private string getAndroidSensitiveInfoRegex() { result = "(?i).*(email|phone|ticket).*" }
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/** Finds variables that hold sensitive information judging by their names. */
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private class SensitiveInfoExpr extends Expr {
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SensitiveInfoExpr() {
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exists(Variable v | this = v.getAnAccess() |
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v.getName().regexpMatch([getCommonSensitiveInfoRegex(), getAndroidSensitiveInfoRegex()])
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)
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}
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}
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private predicate maybeNullArg(Expr ex) {
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exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink, MethodAccess ma |
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ex = ma.getAnArgument() and
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sink.asExpr() = ex and
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src.asExpr() instanceof NullLiteral
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|
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DataFlow::localFlow(src, sink)
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)
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}
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private predicate maybeEmptyArrayArg(Expr ex) {
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exists(DataFlow::Node src, DataFlow::Node sink, MethodAccess ma |
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ex = ma.getAnArgument() and
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sink.asExpr() = ex and
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src.asExpr().(ArrayCreationExpr).getFirstDimensionSize() = 0
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|
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DataFlow::localFlow(src, sink)
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)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if a `sendBroadcast` call doesn't specify receiver permission.
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*/
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private predicate isSensitiveBroadcastSink(DataFlow::Node sendBroadcastCallArg) {
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exists(MethodAccess ma, string name | ma.getMethod().hasName(name) |
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ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType().getASourceSupertype*() instanceof TypeContext and
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sendBroadcastCallArg.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument() and
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(
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name = "sendBroadcast" and
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(
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// sendBroadcast(Intent intent)
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ma.getNumArgument() = 1
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or
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// sendBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission)
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(1))
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)
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or
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name = "sendBroadcastAsUser" and
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(
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// sendBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user)
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ma.getNumArgument() = 2
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or
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// sendBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user, String receiverPermission)
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(2))
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)
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or
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// sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(Intent intent, String[] receiverPermissions)
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name = "sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions" and
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maybeEmptyArrayArg(ma.getArgument(1))
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or
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// Method calls of `sendOrderedBroadcast` whose second argument is always `receiverPermission`
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name = "sendOrderedBroadcast" and
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(
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// sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission)
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// sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(1)) and
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ma.getNumArgument() = [2, 7]
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or
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// sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission, String receiverAppOp, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(1)) and
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(2)) and
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ma.getNumArgument() = 8
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)
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or
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// sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user, String receiverPermission, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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name = "sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser" and
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maybeNullArg(ma.getArgument(2))
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or
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// sendStickyBroadcast(Intent intent)
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// sendStickyBroadcast(Intent intent, Bundle options)
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// sendStickyBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user)
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// sendStickyOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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// sendStickyOrderedBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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name =
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[
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"sendStickyBroadcast", "sendStickyBroadcastAsUser", "sendStickyOrderedBroadcast",
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"sendStickyOrderedBroadcastAsUser"
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]
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)
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)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if `arg` is an argument in a use of a `startActivity` or `startService` method that sends an Intent to another application.
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*/
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private predicate isStartActivityOrServiceSink(DataFlow::Node arg) {
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exists(MethodAccess ma, string name | ma.getMethod().hasName(name) |
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arg.asExpr() = ma.getArgument(0) and
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ma.getMethod().getDeclaringType().getASourceSupertype*() instanceof TypeContext and
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// startActivity(Intent intent)
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// startActivity(Intent intent, Bundle options)
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// startActivities(Intent[] intents)
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// startActivities(Intent[] intents, Bundle options)
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// startService(Intent service)
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// startForegroundService(Intent service)
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// bindService (Intent service, int flags, Executor executor, ServiceConnection conn)
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// bindService (Intent service, Executor executor, ServiceConnection conn)
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name =
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["startActivity", "startActivities", "startService", "startForegroundService", "bindService"]
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)
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}
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private predicate isCleanIntent(Expr intent) {
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intent.getType() instanceof TypeIntent and
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(
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exists(MethodAccess setRecieverMa |
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setRecieverMa.getQualifier() = intent and
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setRecieverMa.getMethod().hasName(["setPackage", "setClass", "setClassName", "setComponent"])
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)
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or
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// Handle the cases where the PackageContext and Class are set at construction time
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// Intent(Context packageContext, Class<?> cls)
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// Intent(String action, Uri uri, Context packageContext, Class<?> cls)
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exists(ConstructorCall cc | cc = intent |
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cc.getConstructedType() instanceof TypeIntent and
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cc.getNumArgument() > 1 and
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(
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cc.getArgument(0).getType() instanceof TypeContext and
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not maybeNullArg(cc.getArgument(1))
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or
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cc.getArgument(2).getType() instanceof TypeContext and
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not maybeNullArg(cc.getArgument(3))
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)
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)
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)
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}
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/**
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* Taint configuration tracking flow from variables containing sensitive information to broadcast Intents.
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*/
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class SensitiveCommunicationConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
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SensitiveCommunicationConfig() { this = "Sensitive Communication Configuration" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
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source.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveInfoExpr
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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isSensitiveBroadcastSink(sink)
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or
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isStartActivityOrServiceSink(sink)
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}
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/**
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* Holds if broadcast doesn't specify receiving package name of the 3rd party app
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*/
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override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
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exists(DataFlow::Node intent | isCleanIntent(intent.asExpr()) |
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DataFlow::localFlow(intent, node)
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)
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}
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override predicate allowImplicitRead(DataFlow::Node node, DataFlow::Content c) {
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super.allowImplicitRead(node, c)
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or
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this.isSink(node)
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}
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}
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@@ -2,30 +2,24 @@
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<qhelp>
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<overview>
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<p>Broadcast intents in an Android application are visible to all applications installed on the same mobile device, exposing all sensitive information they contain.</p>
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<p>Broadcasts are vulnerable to passive eavesdropping or active denial of service attacks when an intent is broadcast without specifying any receiver permission or receiver application.</p>
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<p>When an implicit Intent is used with a method such as <code>startActivity</code>, <code>startService</code>, or <code>sendBroadcast</code>, it may be read by other applications on the device.</p>
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<p>This means that sensitive data in these Intents may be leaked.</p>
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</overview>
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<recommendation>
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<p>
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Specify a receiver permission or application when broadcasting intents, or switch to
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<code>LocalBroadcastManager</code>
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or the latest
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<code>LiveData</code>
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library.
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For <code>sendBroadcast</code> methods, a receiver permission may be specified so that only applications with a certain permission may receive the Intent;
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or a <code>LocalBroadcastManager</code> may be used.
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Otherwise, ensure that Intents containing sensitive data have an explicit receiver class set.
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</p>
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</recommendation>
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<example>
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<p>The following example shows two ways of broadcasting intents. In the 'BAD' case, no "receiver permission" is specified. In the 'GOOD' case, "receiver permission" or "receiver application" is specified.</p>
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<sample src="SensitiveBroadcast.java" />
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<p>The following example shows two ways of broadcasting Intents. In the 'BAD' case, no "receiver permission" is specified. In the 'GOOD' case, "receiver permission" or "receiver application" is specified.</p>
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<sample src="SensitiveCommunication.java" />
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</example>
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<references>
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<li>
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CWE:
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<a href="https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/927.html">CWE-927: Use of Implicit Intent for Sensitive Communication</a>
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</li>
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<li>
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Android Developers:
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<a href="https://developer.android.com/guide/components/broadcasts">Security considerations and best practices for sending and receiving broadcasts</a>
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@@ -46,5 +40,9 @@
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Android Developers:
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<a href="https://developer.android.com/topic/libraries/architecture/livedata">Android LiveData Overview</a>
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</li>
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<li>
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Oversecured:
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<a href="https://blog.oversecured.com/Interception-of-Android-implicit-intents/">Interception of Android implicit intents</a>
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</li>
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</references>
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</qhelp>
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21
java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/SensitiveCommunication.ql
Normal file
21
java/ql/src/Security/CWE/CWE-927/SensitiveCommunication.ql
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
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/**
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* @name Leaking sensitive information through an implicit Intent
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* @description An Android application uses implicit Intents containing sensitive data
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* in a way that exposes it to arbitrary applications on the device.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity warning
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* @security-severity 8.2
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* @precision medium
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* @id java/android/sensitive-communication
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-927
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*/
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.security.AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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from SensitiveCommunicationConfig cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
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where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
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select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "This call may leak sensitive information from $@.",
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source.getNode(), "here"
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@@ -1,175 +0,0 @@
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/**
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* @name Broadcasting sensitive data to all Android applications
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* @description An Android application uses implicit intents to broadcast
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* sensitive data to all applications without specifying any
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* receiver permission.
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* @kind path-problem
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* @problem.severity warning
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* @precision medium
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* @id java/sensitive-broadcast
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* @tags security
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* external/cwe/cwe-927
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*/
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import java
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow3
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import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
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import semmle.code.java.frameworks.android.Intent
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import semmle.code.java.security.SensitiveActions
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import DataFlow::PathGraph
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/**
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* Gets regular expression for matching names of Android variables that indicate the value being held contains sensitive information.
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*/
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private string getAndroidSensitiveInfoRegex() { result = "(?i).*(email|phone|ticket).*" }
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/**
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* Method call to pass information to the `Intent` object.
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*/
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class PutIntentExtraMethodAccess extends MethodAccess {
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PutIntentExtraMethodAccess() {
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(
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getMethod().getName().matches("put%Extra") or
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getMethod().hasName("putExtras")
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) and
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getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeIntent
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}
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}
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/**
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* Method call to pass information to the intent extra bundle object.
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*/
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class PutBundleExtraMethodAccess extends MethodAccess {
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PutBundleExtraMethodAccess() {
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getMethod().getName().regexpMatch("put\\w+") and
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getMethod().getDeclaringType().getASupertype*().hasQualifiedName("android.os", "BaseBundle")
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}
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}
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/** Finds variables that hold sensitive information judging by their names. */
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class SensitiveInfoExpr extends Expr {
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SensitiveInfoExpr() {
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exists(Variable v | this = v.getAnAccess() |
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v.getName().regexpMatch([getCommonSensitiveInfoRegex(), getAndroidSensitiveInfoRegex()])
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)
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}
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}
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/**
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* A method access of the `Context.sendBroadcast` family.
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*/
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class SendBroadcastMethodAccess extends MethodAccess {
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SendBroadcastMethodAccess() {
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this.getMethod().getDeclaringType() instanceof TypeContext and
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this.getMethod().getName().matches("send%Broadcast%")
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}
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}
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private class NullArgFlowConfig extends DataFlow2::Configuration {
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NullArgFlowConfig() { this = "Flow configuration with a null argument" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) { src.asExpr() instanceof NullLiteral }
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(SendBroadcastMethodAccess ma | sink.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument())
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}
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}
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private class EmptyArrayArgFlowConfig extends DataFlow3::Configuration {
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EmptyArrayArgFlowConfig() { this = "Flow configuration with an empty array argument" }
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override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node src) {
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src.asExpr().(ArrayCreationExpr).getFirstDimensionSize() = 0
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}
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override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(SendBroadcastMethodAccess ma | sink.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument())
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}
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}
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/**
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* Holds if a `sendBroadcast` call doesn't specify receiver permission.
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*/
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predicate isSensitiveBroadcastSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
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exists(SendBroadcastMethodAccess ma |
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sink.asExpr() = ma.getAnArgument() and
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(
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ma.getMethod().hasName("sendBroadcast") and
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(
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ma.getNumArgument() = 1 // sendBroadcast(Intent intent)
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or
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// sendBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission)
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exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(1))))
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)
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or
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ma.getMethod().hasName("sendBroadcastAsUser") and
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(
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ma.getNumArgument() = 2 or // sendBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user)
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exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(2)))) // sendBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user, String receiverPermission)
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)
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or
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ma.getMethod().hasName("sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions") and
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exists(EmptyArrayArgFlowConfig config |
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config.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(1))) // sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(Intent intent, String[] receiverPermissions)
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)
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||||
or
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// Method calls of `sendOrderedBroadcast` whose second argument is always `receiverPermission`
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ma.getMethod().hasName("sendOrderedBroadcast") and
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(
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// sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission) or sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
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exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(1)))) and
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ma.getNumArgument() <= 7
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or
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||||
// sendOrderedBroadcast(Intent intent, String receiverPermission, String receiverAppOp, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)
|
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exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(1)))) and
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||||
exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(2)))) and
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ma.getNumArgument() = 8
|
||||
)
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||||
or
|
||||
// Method call of `sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser(Intent intent, UserHandle user, String receiverPermission, BroadcastReceiver resultReceiver, Handler scheduler, int initialCode, String initialData, Bundle initialExtras)`
|
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ma.getMethod().hasName("sendOrderedBroadcastAsUser") and
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exists(NullArgFlowConfig conf | conf.hasFlow(_, DataFlow::exprNode(ma.getArgument(2))))
|
||||
)
|
||||
)
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||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Taint configuration tracking flow from variables containing sensitive information to broadcast intents.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
class SensitiveBroadcastConfig extends TaintTracking::Configuration {
|
||||
SensitiveBroadcastConfig() { this = "Sensitive Broadcast Configuration" }
|
||||
|
||||
override predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
|
||||
source.asExpr() instanceof SensitiveInfoExpr
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||||
}
|
||||
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||||
override predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) { isSensitiveBroadcastSink(sink) }
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Holds if there is an additional flow step from `PutIntentExtraMethodAccess` or `PutBundleExtraMethodAccess` that taints the `Intent` or its extras `Bundle`.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
override predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node node1, DataFlow::Node node2) {
|
||||
exists(PutIntentExtraMethodAccess pia |
|
||||
node1.asExpr() = pia.getAnArgument() and node2.asExpr() = pia.getQualifier()
|
||||
)
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||||
or
|
||||
exists(PutBundleExtraMethodAccess pba |
|
||||
node1.asExpr() = pba.getAnArgument() and node2.asExpr() = pba.getQualifier()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Holds if broadcast doesn't specify receiving package name of the 3rd party app
|
||||
*/
|
||||
override predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node node) {
|
||||
exists(MethodAccess setReceiverMa |
|
||||
setReceiverMa.getMethod().hasName(["setPackage", "setClass", "setClassName", "setComponent"]) and
|
||||
setReceiverMa.getQualifier().(VarAccess).getVariable().getAnAccess() = node.asExpr()
|
||||
)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
from SensitiveBroadcastConfig cfg, DataFlow::PathNode source, DataFlow::PathNode sink
|
||||
where cfg.hasFlowPath(source, sink)
|
||||
select sink.getNode(), source, sink, "Sending $@ to broadcast.", source.getNode(),
|
||||
"sensitive information"
|
||||
@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
|
||||
edges
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:12:34:12:38 | token : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:13:41:13:52 | refreshToken : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:25:32:25:39 | password : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:26:31:26:36 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:36:35:36:39 | email : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:38:31:38:36 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:9:50:16 | userinfo [post update] [<element>] : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:52:31:52:36 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:22:50:29 | password : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:9:50:16 | userinfo [post update] [<element>] : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:97:35:97:40 | ticket : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:98:54:98:59 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:109:32:109:39 | passcode : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:111:54:111:59 | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:136:33:136:38 | passwd : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:140:54:140:59 | intent |
|
||||
nodes
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:12:34:12:38 | token : String | semmle.label | token : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:13:41:13:52 | refreshToken : String | semmle.label | refreshToken : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:25:32:25:39 | password : String | semmle.label | password : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:26:31:26:36 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:36:35:36:39 | email : String | semmle.label | email : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:38:31:38:36 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:9:50:16 | userinfo [post update] [<element>] : String | semmle.label | userinfo [post update] [<element>] : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:22:50:29 | password : String | semmle.label | password : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:52:31:52:36 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:97:35:97:40 | ticket : String | semmle.label | ticket : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:98:54:98:59 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:109:32:109:39 | passcode : String | semmle.label | passcode : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:111:54:111:59 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:136:33:136:38 | passwd : String | semmle.label | passwd : String |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:140:54:140:59 | intent | semmle.label | intent |
|
||||
subpaths
|
||||
#select
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:12:34:12:38 | token : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:12:34:12:38 | token | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:13:41:13:52 | refreshToken : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:14:31:14:36 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:13:41:13:52 | refreshToken | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:26:31:26:36 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:25:32:25:39 | password : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:26:31:26:36 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:25:32:25:39 | password | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:38:31:38:36 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:36:35:36:39 | email : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:38:31:38:36 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:36:35:36:39 | email | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:52:31:52:36 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:22:50:29 | password : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:52:31:52:36 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:50:22:50:29 | password | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:98:54:98:59 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:97:35:97:40 | ticket : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:98:54:98:59 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:97:35:97:40 | ticket | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:111:54:111:59 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:109:32:109:39 | passcode : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:111:54:111:59 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:109:32:109:39 | passcode | sensitive information |
|
||||
| SensitiveBroadcast.java:140:54:140:59 | intent | SensitiveBroadcast.java:136:33:136:38 | passwd : String | SensitiveBroadcast.java:140:54:140:59 | intent | Sending $@ to broadcast. | SensitiveBroadcast.java:136:33:136:38 | passwd | sensitive information |
|
||||
@@ -1 +0,0 @@
|
||||
experimental/Security/CWE/CWE-927/SensitiveBroadcast.ql
|
||||
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
intent.setAction("com.example.custom_action");
|
||||
intent.putExtra("token", token);
|
||||
intent.putExtra("refreshToken", refreshToken);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BAD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with intent extra.
|
||||
@@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
intent.setAction("com.example.custom_action");
|
||||
intent.putExtra("name", userName);
|
||||
intent.putExtra("pwd", password);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BAD - Tests broadcast of email information with extra bundle.
|
||||
@@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
Bundle bundle = new Bundle();
|
||||
bundle.putString("email", email);
|
||||
intent.putExtras(bundle);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BAD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with null permission.
|
||||
@@ -49,7 +49,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
userinfo.add(username);
|
||||
userinfo.add(password);
|
||||
intent.putStringArrayListExtra("userinfo", userinfo);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent, null);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcast(intent, null); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with permission using string literal.
|
||||
@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
Intent intent = new Intent();
|
||||
intent.setAction("com.example.custom_action");
|
||||
intent.putExtra("ticket", ticket);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, new String[]{});
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, new String[]{}); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// BAD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with multiple permissions using empty array initialization through a variable.
|
||||
@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
intent.putExtra("name", username);
|
||||
intent.putExtra("pwd", passcode);
|
||||
String[] perms = new String[0];
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with multiple permissions.
|
||||
@@ -137,12 +137,11 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
intent.putExtras(bundle);
|
||||
String[] perms = new String[0];
|
||||
String[] perms2 = perms;
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms2);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms2); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* BAD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with multiple permissions using empty array initialization through two variables and `intent.getExtras().putString()`.
|
||||
* Note this case of `getExtras().putString(...)` is not yet detected thus is beyond what the query is capable of.
|
||||
*/
|
||||
public void sendBroadcast12(Context context) {
|
||||
String username = "test123";
|
||||
@@ -156,7 +155,7 @@ class SensitiveBroadcast {
|
||||
intent.getExtras().putString("pwd", password);
|
||||
String[] perms = new String[0];
|
||||
String[] perms2 = perms;
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms2);
|
||||
context.sendBroadcastWithMultiplePermissions(intent, perms2); // $ hasTaintFlow
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
// GOOD - Tests broadcast of sensitive user information with ordered broadcast.
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
|
||||
import java
|
||||
import semmle.code.java.security.AndroidSensitiveCommunicationQuery
|
||||
import TestUtilities.InlineExpectationsTest
|
||||
import TestUtilities.InlineFlowTest
|
||||
|
||||
class HasFlowTest extends InlineFlowTest {
|
||||
override DataFlow::Configuration getTaintFlowConfig() {
|
||||
result = any(SensitiveCommunicationConfig c)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
override DataFlow::Configuration getValueFlowConfig() { none() }
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -1 +1 @@
|
||||
// semmle-extractor-options: --javac-args -cp ${testdir}/../../../../stubs/google-android-9.0.0
|
||||
// semmle-extractor-options: --javac-args -cp ${testdir}/../../../stubs/google-android-9.0.0
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user