diff --git a/codeql-sqlite-java/full-query.ql b/codeql-sqlite-java/full-query.ql
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+/**
+ * @name SQLI Vulnerability
+ * @description Using untrusted strings in a sql query allows sql injection attacks.
+ * @kind path-problem
+ * @id cpp/SQLIVulnerable
+ * @problem.severity warning
+ */
+
+import java
+import semmle.code.java.dataflow.TaintTracking
+import semmle.code.java.dataflow.DataFlow 
+
+/**
+ * A global data-flow configuration using modules
+ */
+// Note result differences between 
+module InputToSQL = TaintTracking::Global<SqliFlowConfig>;
+// and 
+// module InputToSQL = DataFlow::Global<SqliFlowConfig>;
+
+module SqliFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
+  predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
+    // System.console().readLine();
+    exists(Call read |
+      read.getCallee().getName() = "readLine" and
+      read = source.asExpr()
+    )
+  }
+
+  predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
+    // conn.createStatement().executeUpdate(query);
+    exists(Call exec |
+      exec.getCallee().getName() = "executeUpdate" and
+      exec.getArgument(0) = sink.asExpr()
+    )
+  }
+
+  // predicate isSanitizer(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { none() }
+
+  // predicate isAdditionalTaintStep(DataFlow::Node into, DataFlow::Node out) {
+  //   // Extra taint step
+  //   //     String.format("INSERT INTO users VALUES (%d, '%s')", id, info);
+  //   // Not needed here, but may be needed for larger libraries.
+  //   none()
+  // }
+}
+
+// To construct the paths between sources and sinks.
+import InputToSQL::PathGraph
+
+from InputToSQL::PathNode source, InputToSQL::PathNode sink
+where InputToSQL::flowPath(source, sink)
+select sink, source, sink, "Possible SQL injection"