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codeql-dataflow-sql-injection/SqlInjection.ql
2025-02-17 17:09:04 -08:00

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/**
* @name SQLI Vulnerability
* @description Using untrusted strings in a sql query allows sql injection attacks.
* @kind path-problem
* @id cpp/sqlivulnerable
* @problem.severity warning
*/
import cpp
import semmle.code.cpp.dataflow.new.TaintTracking
module SqliFlowConfig implements DataFlow::ConfigSig {
predicate isSource(DataFlow::Node source) {
// count = read(STDIN_FILENO, buf, BUFSIZE);
exists(FunctionCall read |
read.getTarget().getName() = "read" and
read.getArgument(1) = source.(DataFlow::PostUpdateNode).getPreUpdateNode().asExpr()
)
}
predicate isBarrier(DataFlow::Node sanitizer) { none() }
predicate isAdditionalFlowStep(DataFlow::Node into, DataFlow::Node out) {
// Extra taint step
// snprintf(query, bufsize, "INSERT INTO users VALUES (%d, '%s')", id, info);
// But snprintf is a macro on mac os. The actual function's name is
// #undef snprintf
// #define snprintf(str, len, ...) \
// __builtin___snprintf_chk (str, len, 0, __darwin_obsz(str), __VA_ARGS__)
// #endif
exists(FunctionCall printf |
printf.getTarget().getName().matches("%snprintf%") and
printf.getArgument(0) = out.(DataFlow::PostUpdateNode).getPreUpdateNode().asExpr() and
// very specific: shifted index for macro.
printf.getArgument(6) = into.asExpr()
)
}
predicate isSink(DataFlow::Node sink) {
// rc = sqlite3_exec(db, query, NULL, 0, &zErrMsg);
exists(FunctionCall exec |
exec.getTarget().getName() = "sqlite3_exec" and
exec.getArgument(1) = sink.asExpr()
)
}
}
module MyFlow = TaintTracking::Global<SqliFlowConfig>;
import MyFlow::PathGraph
from MyFlow::PathNode source, MyFlow::PathNode sink
where MyFlow::flowPath(source, sink)
select sink, source, sink, "Possible SQL injection"